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Introduction 
We all divide our worlds into categories.  However, 
our  mental  categories  may not  exactly  correspond  to 
those in which researchers are interested.  Under these 
circumstances, data quality seems likely to suffer.  One 
point of this paper is to explore how different types of 
categories  affect  peoples'  accuracy  when  they  report 
frequencies for those categories. 
Survey respondents  are often asked to report their 
frequency of activity for particular categories of events 
or objects (e.g., Blair & Burton,  1987;  Burton & Blair, 
1991).  In order to answer "How many magazines did 
you purchase last month?"  one must determine which 
publications qualify as magazines and report a number 
for all of those items but no others.  If there is more 
than  one  way  to  answer  such  questions,  that  could 
affect the accuracy of respondents' estimates. 
In  recent  years,  it  has  been  demonstrated  that 
respondents  produce  frequencies  by  either  counting 
retrieved  memories  --  an  Enumeration  strategy  --  or 
applying  rate  of  occurrence  knowledge  --  a  Rate 
strategy (e.g.,  Blair & Burton,  1987;  Burton & Blair, 
1991;  Means  &  Loftus,  1991;  Menon,  1993).  More 
recently,  it  has been  shown  that  they  also  rely  on  a 
non-numerical  sense  of  magnitude  (Brown,  1994; 
Conrad, Brown &  Cashman,  1993).  When instructed 
to  verbalize  their  thinking,  respondents  and 
experimental subjects sometimes justify their estimates 
with statements such as "that happened a lot," or "that 
was very rare." Under certain conditions,  respondents 
predominantly rely on such "general impressions."  A 
second point of the current paper is to monitor the use 
and accuracy of strategies that rely on non-numerical 
information, especially for different types of categories. 
The Experiment 
Rationale.  Categories  in  many  survey  questions 
differ  in  their  level  of abstraction.  For  example,  a 
category  such  as  Poultry  is  more  abstract  than  a 
category such as Chicken which is itself more abstract 
than  a  category  like  Chicken  Parts.  To  answer  a 
question about poultry purchases,  a  respondent  might 
need to consider their chicken and turkey purchases if 
that  is  how  they  have  structured  the  relevant 
information  in  their  memories  (Felcher  &  Calder, 
1992). However it is also conceivable they might need 
to  further  decompose  those  categories  to  retrieve 
frequency-relevant information. 
One  influential  view  of  mental  categories  (e.g. 
Rosch, Mervis,  Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem,  1976) 
holds  that  there  is  an  optimal  or  "basic  level"  of 
abstraction,  midway  between  the  most  abstract  and 
most  concrete  categories,  which  people 
overwhelmingly  prefer  to  use  (for  reviews,  see 
Barsalou, 1991 and Lakoff, 1987).  In the current study 
we compare frequency reports for basic level categories 
to  those  for  higher  level  or  superordinate  categories. 
The  effects  on  frequency judgments  of certain  non- 
basic level categories have been reported (Barsalou & 
Ross,  1986),  but  to  our  knowledge,  this  simple 
variation in level of abstractness has not been explored. 
In  the  current  study  we  look  at  the  interplay 
between category abstractness  and the performance  of 
different response strategies. The many strategies used 
by  respondents  to  answer  frequency  questions  are 
applied  under  identifiable  circumstances  (Conrad, 
Brown  &  Cashman,  1993;  Menon,  1993;  Means  & 
Lotus,  1991).  Enumeration  strategies  are  observed 
primarily  when  events  are  distinctive,  occur  on  an 
irregular  schedule  and  are  low  in  actual  frequency. 
Rate  strategies  require  that  rate  information  be 
available which is only likely when events take place 
on a regular schedule.  General impressions seem to be 
used  when  events  are  not  distinctive  and  happen 
irregularly.  They  are  especially  likely  when  these 
conditions are present and actual frequency is high.  In 
this  study,  we  control  these  conditions  through  an 
experimental technique  (Brown,  1994).  In particular, 
we  vary  the  distinctiveness  of  a  set  of  common, 
consumer  products  from  both  basic  level  and 
superordinate product categories, and present them on 
an irregular schedule. 
Design.  The  subjects  were  presented  with  a 
sequence of product names, one at a time, to study for a 
later memory test.  They were then  required to  report 
the frequency of study products in each of a number of 
product  categories.  So,  for  example,  if the  product 
1We thank Erin Cashman for her help collecting data. 
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Newspapers the subject would base  a  response  on the 
number of times the study item had been a newspaper. 
The  subjects  were  in  one  of  four  experimental 
conditions defined by two factors: level of abstractness 
and level of distinctiveness.  The first of these factors, 
abstractness,  concerned  the  type  of product  category 
presented in the test phase.  Subjects were asked about 
either  basic  level  (for  example,  Newspapers)  or 
superordinate  categories  (for  example  Reading 
Material).  The  second  factor,  distinctiveness,  was 
introduced through the presentation of the study items. 
To  make  category  members  relatively  distinctive, 
different products were presented one time each for a 
particular  category,  for  example,  Washington Post, 
New  York Times, Baltimore  Sun.  To  make  them 
similar  to  one  another  -- that  is,  not distinctive  --  a 
single  product  per  category  was  presented  multiple 
times, for example Washington Post, Washington Post, 
Washington Post. The  four  conditions  therefore  are 
referred  to  as  Basic-Same,  Basic-Different, 
Superordinate-Same and Superordinate-Different. 
The study products were chosen to be members of 
both basic level and superordinate test categories.  For 
example,  Washington Post  is  an  instance  of  both 
Newspapers and Reading Material.  The  basic  level 
categories  were  chosen  so  that  more  than  one  could 
share  a  superordinate  category.  For  example, 
Newspapers, Magazines and Reference Books all share 
the superordinate category Reading Materials.  There 
were 36  Superordinate categories,  each of which were 
associated  with  one,  three  or  four  basic  level 
categories.  Product  frequency  for  the  basic  level 
categories  was  counterbalanceA  so  that  the  product 
frequency  for  a  superordinate  was  not  related  to  the 
number  of basic  level  categories  with  which  it  was 
associated.  Overall  frequency  for  the  superordinate 
categories was either four, seven, nine or twelve.  The 
stimuli are available from the authors. 
The  sequence  in  which the  study  products  were 
presented  was  random  with  the  constraints  that 
products from the same basic level category be spread 
throughout the sequence in roughly even intervals and 
products  from  the  same  superordinate  (but  different 
basic  level  categories)  be  separated  by  at  least  one 
product  from  a  different  superordinate,  items,  in 
effect,  occurred  irregularly.  Altogether,  the  unique 
study sequence was generated for each subject. 
The  test  sequences  were  essentially  random. 
Twenty  per  cent  of  the  test  categories  were  "catch 
trials,"  that  is,  no  study  items  from  those  categories 
had  been  presented  and  therefore  the  frequency  was 
zero.  In  the  Basic-Same  and  Basic-Different 
conditions,  the  test sequence  included 42  trials and a 
unique sequence was generated for each subject. In the 
Superordinate-Same  and  Superordinate-Different 
conditions, the test sequence consisted of 17 trials.  In 
all  conditions,  the first two test trials were treated  as 
practice. 
Procedure.  Each  product  in the  study phase  was 
presented  on  a  computer  screen  for  six  seconds.  In 
addition  to  the  product,  its  basic  level  category  was 
also  presented  above  it  on  the  screen  to  reduce 
ambiguity  about  category  assignment.  The  subjects 
were instructed to study each product-category pair for 
a later memory test, but they were not told the nature of 
this test. 
In  the  test  phase,  the  subjects  were  instructed  to 
report  the  number  of times  they  had  been  presented 
products from each test category.  They were instructed 
to report zero when no study items had been presented 
for  a  test  category.  They  were  encouraged  to  be  as 
accurate  as  possible  and  take  as  much  time  as  they 
needed.  Each test category appeared  on the  computer 
screen  until  the  subject  typed  in  a  frequency  and 
pressed the Enter key.  The subjects were instructed to 
verbalize their thinking while arriving at a  frequency, 
that is, to provide concurrent, verbal protocols, and an 
experimenter  was  present  to  assure  that  they  kept 
~ng  (Ericsson  &  Simon,  1993).  The  subjects 
were instnacted to complete their verbal report prior to 
entering  a  frequency  response.  Their  protocols  were 
tape  recorded  and  their  frequency  responses  were 
recorded by the experimental software. 
Subjects. Thirty  two  subjects  were  recruited  from 
an advertisement placed in the Washington Post. Eight 
were randomly assigned to each of the four conditions. 
All of the subjects (except three who were employed by 
U.S.  government)  were  paid  $25;  government 
employees were not compensated and were assigned to 
different conditions. 
Predictions.  Since  the  study  items  were  not 
presented in a regular sequence, Rate strategies are not 
possible  and  therefore  we  do  not  expect  to  observe 
them in the protocols.  When individual  episodes  are 
distinctive in peoples' memories, it is possible for them 
to  be  retrieved  and  enumerated.  The  Basic-Different 
and  Superordinate-Different  conditions  create  such 
circumstances,  and  so  we  expect  Enumeration  to  be 
prevalent  in  these  conditions.  While  subjects  might 
have  other  information  available  to  them  in  this 
condition, such as general impressions, we expect them 
to enumerate whenever it is possible. 
In  the  Basic-Same  and  Superordinate-Same 
conditions, it is difficult, if not impossible, for subjects 
to  retrieve  and  count  episodes.  Each  time  they  are 
presented a product from a test category, it is the same 
product.  There  is  nothing  to  distinguish  one 
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subjects are likely to rely on non-numerical frequency 
information.  In particular, we predict a high incidence 
of General Impression statements in the protocols and 
some kind of Memory Assessment--judgments based 
on memory processes and  states,  rather than content. 
A  well-publicized example  of Memory Assessment is 
the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman,  1973) 
in which  subjects'  estimates  are based on the  ease  of 
retrieving  category  members.  Unfortunately  think 
aloud  procedures  are  not  sensitive  to  Memory 
Assessment strategies because estimating frequency on 
the  basis  of  Memory  Assessment  does  not  require 
people  to be  aware  of its  use.  Therefore,  in  the  two 
Same  conditions,  we  also  expect  a  relatively  high 
number of uninformative protocols. 
Turning now to accuracy,  we predict that subjects 
will  underestimate  actual  frequency  in  the  Basic- 
Different and Superordinate-Ditferent conditions.  This 
should  occur because  Enumeration  will  be  prevalent 
and should lead only to errors of omission: It is much 
more likely that subjects will forget a  pertinent  study 
episode  than  will  "recall"  one  that  never  actually 
occurred.  We  expect  that  in  the  Superordinate- 
Different  condition  subjects  will  decompose 
superordinate  test  categories  into  their  component, 
basic  level  categories.  This  should  lead  to  more 
underestimation  in  the  Superordinate-Different  than 
Basic-Different  condition  because  in  the  former 
condition  such  error  can  arise  when  subjects  forget 
entire  basic  level  categories  and  when  they  forget 
products  from  within  categories  that  they  do  recall 
(Tulving & Pearlstone,  1966). 
We  expect  a  different  pattern  of  results  for  the 
Basic-Same  and  Superordinate-Same  conditions 
because we expect these subjects to rely predominantly 
on  strategies  other  than  Enumeration.  Our  view  of 
non-numerical  strategies  is  that  they  first  involve 
retrieving an impression or forming one via Memory 
Assessment.  Subjects must then convert this sense of 
magnitude into a  number.  If people lack a  metric for 
this  conversion,  then  in  general,  they  can  be  quite 
inaccurate:  Subjects  can  either  underestimate  or 
overestimate  but  the  overestimates  should  be  larger, 
leading  to  net  overestimation.  This  is  because 
underestimates  cannot  be  smaller  than  zero  so  the 
largest underestimate possible is  100%; overestimates, 
are  essentially  unbounded  and  can,  in  principle,  be 
many times larger than the actual frequency  2. 
On  the  basis  of this  reasoning,  we  expect  large 
overestimation  in  the  Basic-Same  condition.  In  the 
Superordinate-Same condition, the ability to enumerate 
individual,  basic  level  categories  could  reduce 
overestimation. In particular, subjects can forget entire, 
basic level categories or use the  number of categories 
that they do recall as a  kind of anchor.  In fact,  it is 
hard to know how the tendency to overestimate (due to 
the  lack  of metric  information)  and  the  tendency  to 
underestimate  (due  to  forgetting  or  anchoring)  will 
play out in the  accuracy  scores,  but at  minimum,  we 
can expect reported frequencies  in the  Superordinate- 
Same  condition  to  be  larger  (even  if  they  are  not 
overestimates)  than  in  the  Superordinate-Different 
condition where there should be only underestimation. 
Results and Discussion 
Strategy  Use. The  verbal  protocols  for  each  trial 
were classified into several  strategy categories by two 
coders.  A  sample  of  25%  of  the  protocols  were 
classified by both coders and the  correlation was r  - 
.99,  p  <  .01.  The  major  classes  of  strategy  were 
Enumeration,  General  Impression,  and  Unjustified 
Response  (uninformative  protocols).  If  subjects 
reported that a frequency was zero that was in fact non- 
zero, the protocol was not coded.  Details of the coding 
criteria are available from the authors. 
Figure  1 shows the proportions of responses based 
on Enumeration and General  Impression strategies as 
well  as  Unjustified  responses.  Clearly,  the  Same- 
Different  manipulation  had  the  predicted  effect  on 
strategy  use.  Enumeration  strategies  dominated  the 
two Different conditions,  86% and 94% in the Basic- 
Different  and  Superordinate-Different  conditions, 
respectively.  Presumably  people  prefer  to  enumerate 
when they can, even if they have other options. In the 
Basic-Different condition, six per cent of the responses 
were  based  on  general  impression  statements, 
primarily  at  the  two  higher  frequencies  (9  and  12). 
This  is  consistent with the  idea  that  Enumeration  is 
most likely when frequencies are low (Burton & Blair, 
1987;  Blair  &  Burton,  1991);  when  frequencies  are 
high,  people  are  more  likely  to  rely  on  general 
impressions (Conrad, Brown &  Cashman,  1993).  One 
explanation  for  this  is  that  the  more  often  an  event 
occurs,  the  more  opportunities  one  has  to  form  an 
impression of its frequency. 
2Subjects  are  told  the  number  of study  items  which 
may  provide  a  practical  upper  bound  on  their 
estimates. 
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Figure  1.  Proportion  of  responses  based  on 
Enumeration and General  Impression strategies,  and 
Unjustified  Responses.  Number  of  observations  are 
213,  89,  236  and  93  for  Basic-Different, 
Superordinate-Different,  Basic-Same,  and  Super- 
ordinate-Same. 
In  the  two  Same  conditions,  the  subjects  used  a 
General  Impression  strategy  more  than  any  other 
approach,  on  53%  of  the  trials  in  the  Basic-Same 
condition  and  65%  in  the  Superordinate-Same 
condition.  As we expected, the number of Unjustified 
responses was large in these conditions as well,  36% 
and 33% respectively.  This  suggests that subjects do 
not  have  access  to  discriminable  memories  for 
individual study presentations. 
Accuracy.  In  all  conditions  of  the  experiment, 
subjects  were  extremely  sensitive  to  whether  or  not 
products from a test category had appeared in the study 
phase.  Subjects  correctly  reported  zero  as  the 
frequency  for  97%  of the  catch  trials.  This  strongly 
suggests that the subjects were paying attention in both 
phases and striving to be accurate in the test phase. 
In  order  to  compare  estimates  in  the  two  Basic 
conditions to those in the two Superordinate conditions 
we  have  summed  the  estimates  for  the  basic  level 
categories within each superordinate. For example, the 
estimates  for Newspapers, Magazines,  and Reference 
Books are combined and  then  compared to  estimates 
for Reading Materials. To evaluate our predictions, we 
use  a  signed,  proportional  error  measure:  (estimated 
frequency  - actual frequency) /  actual  frequency.  A 
score less than zero indicates underestimation; a  score 
greater  than  zero  indicates  overestimation.  These 
scores  are  presented  in  Table  1  for  the  four 
experimental conditions. 
lax)king  first  at  Column  1  (the  Different 
conditions) it is clear that unique products within the 
test  categories  lead  to  underestimation,  as  predicted. 
The  amount of underestimation is  marginally greater 
in  the  Superordinate-Different  condition  than  in  the 
Basic-Different condition, F  (1,  378) =  3.53, p  <  .10. 
We predicted a difference between these means on the 
grounds  that  subjects  in  the  Superordinate-Same 
condition could forget entire basic  level  categories  as 
well as products from within categories.  One piece of 
evidence  that  subjects  forgot  entire  categories  is  the 
fact that only 21% of the  protocols  in this  condition 
mentioned all  of the basic  level  categories  that  were 
presented.  The observation that people are most likley 
to enumerate a relatively small number of items (Blair 
& Burton, 1987; Burton & Blair,  1991) seems to apply 
regardless  of whether  the  items  are  members  of the 
same of different categories. 
Different  Same 
Basic  -.22  +.45 
Superordinate  -.40  -.17 
Table  1.  Mean signed proportional error for the four 
experimental conditions. 
When  it  is  unlikely  that  people  will  enumerate 
(Column  2)  they  overestimate  the  frequency  of 
products in basic level categories by 45%, an effect that 
was also predicted.  In contrast, people underestimate 
the frequency of products in  Superordinate  categories 
by 17%.  This amount of underestimation  falls within 
the expected range, namely smaller than the estimates 
in the Basic-Same condition and larger than those in 
the Superordinate-Different condition.  The difference 
between  the  means  in  the  two  Same  conditions  is 
significant, F(1, 378) = 43.86, p  < .01. 
The  top  row  in  Table  1  replicates  a  finding  by 
Brown  (1994).  That  study  was  carried  out  in  a 
different  laboratory  than  the  current  study  with 
different  subjects  and  different  experimental  stimuli. 
The  fact  that  this  effect  generalizes  for  basic  level 
categories,  makes  it  that  much  more  curious  that  it 
should  take  a  different  form  for  superordinate 
categories (the bottom row).  Note that the estimates in 
the  Superordinate-Same  condition  are  relatively 
accurate even though, by our analysis, they result from 
competing  sources  of  error:  overestimation  within 
categories  and underestimation  due  to forgetting and 
anchoring. 
This  pattern  of results  leads  to  an  interaction  of 
Category  Type  (Basic  versus  Superordinate)  x 
Distinctiveness  (Same versus  Different),  F  (1,378)  = 
11.24,  p  <  .01.  The  overestimation  observed  in  the 
Basic-Same condition is expected because there  is  no 
quantitative  reference  for  subjects  to  map  their 
impressions to a number. The mean signed error in this 
condition  differs  from  the  mean  signed  error  in  the 
other three conditions, F(1, 378) = 88.71, p  < .01. This 
difference seems to be responsible for the main effects 
of Category  Type,  F(1,  378)  =  36.07,  p  <  .01,  and 
Distinctiveness, F(1,378) = 46.23, p  < .01. 
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view of the reliability of the strategies used in the four 
conditions.  Absolute  error  is  the  absolute  difference 
between  estimated  and  actual  frequency  on  a  given 
trial.  It  is  insensitive  to  direction  and  simply 
accumulates  all  deviations  from  the  true  frequency. 
Average absolute error rates are presented in Table 2. 
The  units  are  number  of  products  reported  so,  for 
example,  in  the  Basic-Different  condition,  estimates 
deviated  from actual  frequencies by 2.4  products,  on 
average.  The  corresponding  proportional  measures 
(absolute  error  /  average  presentation  frequency)  are 
presented  in  parentheses,  though  our  analyses  are 
confined to the absolute measures.  The Basic-Different 
condition is most accurate, leading to deviations of 2.4 
products  from  the  actual  frequency  versus  errors  of 
about 4 to 5 reported products for the other conditions. 
There is a Category Type x Distinctiveness interaction, 
F(1, 366) =  11.90, p  <  .01 which appears to be driven 
by the greater accuracy of the Basic-Different condition 
than in the other three conditions, F(1,366) =  15.77, p 
<  .01.  This  suggests  that  when  people  cannot  use 
numerical  information  or  the  test  categories  are 
abstract, that the quality of their estimates is likely to 
suffer. 
The  inaccurate  estimates  for  the  Superordinate- 
Same  condition  contrast  with  the  relatively  small 
signed  error  in  that  condition  (-.17).  Apparently 
subjects  are  exhibiting  both  overestimates  and 
underestimates,  which when aggregated, reflects what 
is, at best, an inconsistent strategy.  The main effect of 
Distinctiveness, F(1,366) =  6.87, p  <  .01, underscores 
the point that using qualitative  information generally 
produces inaccurate estimates. 
Different 
Basic  2.40  (.30) 
Superordinate  4.32  (.54) 
Table  2.  Mean  absolute  error 
experimental conditions. 
Same 
5.16  (.65) 
3.94  (.49) 
for  the  four 
The  picture  that  is  emerging  indicates  that 
estinmtes are rarely perfect.  However, it is possible to 
lack  pinpoint  accuracy  but  still  correctly  order  the 
frequency of a  set of items:  One could recognize that 
more  fruit  juices  were  presented  than  magazines 
without  knowing  how  many.  A  numerical  strategy 
such  as  Enumeration  should  lead  to  good  relative 
accuracy  because  numbers  are  inherently  ordered. 
However,  it is unclear if non-numerical strategies will 
lead to reliably ordered estimates.  If they do, then the 
impressions  on  which  they  based  must  accurately 
convey ordinal information. 
Basic 
Superordinate 
*v<.ol 
Different  Same 
.78*  .83* 
.75*  .73* 
Table  3.  Rank  order  correlations  for  the  four 
experimental conditions. 
Rank  order  correlations  of  estimated  and  actual 
frequencies  measure  subjects'  ability  to  order  their 
estimates  (Brown  &  Siegler,  1993).  Because  the 
statistic is not sensitive to the precision of the subjects' 
reports,  it allows us to partially disentangle these two 
types of accuracy. 
Rank  order  correlations  for  each  of  the  four 
conditions  are  presented  in  Table  3.  These  are 
computed  over  all  subjects  in  a  condition,  though 
alternative methods of computing the statistics produce 
comparable results. The correlations are relatively high 
and all are significant beyond the .01  level.  They are 
also of roughly equal magnitude.  This implies that an 
impression  such  as  "all  the  time"  would  have  been 
consistently assigned a larger number than one such as 
,  "some of the time." 
General Discussion 
When  people  are  asked  about  categories  which 
diverge  from  the  way  they  naturally  structure  their 
world (superordinates), the accuracy of their frequency 
estimates will suffer (by at least some measures).  One 
implication would be for authors  of questionnaires  to 
replace superordinate categories with their basic  level 
components  under  the  assumption  that  the  resulting 
questions will refer to more natural  categories.  While 
such  a  decomposition  might  hnprove  the 
communication between researcher and  respondent  it 
will not necessarily improve the accuracy of frequency 
reports.  If respondents are not able or willing to recall 
~ific  instances of the category in question, then they 
are likely to rely on their impressions of frequency.  On 
the  basis  of  our  experimental  restdts,  using  such  a 
strategy on each of several, basic level categories could 
lead  to  overestimation  in  each,  which  when  taken 
together,  would  radically  inflate  the  estimate  for  the 
superordinate  category  in  which  the  researcher  is 
ultimately interested. 
To  improve  the  accuracy of frequencies based  on 
non-numerical information one might ask respondents 
for judgments of relative frequency, or at least analyze 
their  responses  as  ordinal judgments  (Smith,  Hager, 
Palphreyman &  Jobe,  1992).  This may not yield data 
that is as precise as researchers would like, but it may 
1349 be  the  only  kind  of  frequency  report  in  which 
researchers should have confidence for both numerical 
and non-numerical strategies. 
At  least  one  message  resonates  clearly  from  the 
current  study:  A  task which is  as  common place  as 
estimating  frequencies  is  deceptively  complex. 
Experimental studies continue to be a powerful tool for 
bringing  this  complexity  to  light.  Ultimately  this 
should help researchers craft better questions and more 
confidently  interpret  the  estimates  provided  by 
respondents. 
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